A theory may be scientific even if there is not a shred of evidence in its favour, and it may be pseudoscientific even if all the available evidence is in its favour. On this view, the demarcation criterion should not be applied to an isolated hypothesis or theory, but rather to a whole research program that is characterized by a series of theories successively replacing each other.
In his view, a research program is progressive if the new theories make surprising predictions that are confirmed. In contrast, a degenerating research programme is characterized by theories being fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. Progress in science is only possible if a research program satisfies the minimum requirement that each new theory that is developed in the program has a larger empirical content than its predecessor.
If a research program does not satisfy this requirement, then it is pseudoscientific. According to Paul Thagard , , a theory or discipline is pseudoscientific if it satisfies two criteria. A major difference between this approach and that of Lakatos is that Lakatos would classify a nonprogressive discipline as pseudoscientific even if its practitioners work hard to improve it and turn it into a progressive discipline.
In later work, Thagard has abandoned this approach and instead promoted a form of multi-criterial demarcation Thagard , In a somewhat similar vein, Daniel Rothbart emphasized the distinction between the standards to be used when testing a theory and those to be used when determining whether a theory should at all be tested. The latter, the eligibility criteria, include that the theory should encapsulate the explanatory success of its rival, and that it should yield testable implications that are inconsistent with those of the rival.
According to Rothbart, a theory is unscientific if it is not testworthy in this sense. George Reisch proposed that demarcation could be based on the requirement that a scientific discipline be adequately integrated into the other sciences. The various scientific disciplines have strong interconnections that are based on methodology, theory, similarity of models etc. Creationism, for instance, is not scientific because its basic principles and beliefs are incompatible with those that connect and unify the sciences.
More generally speaking, says Reisch, an epistemic field is pseudoscientific if it cannot be incorporated into the existing network of established sciences Reisch ; cf. Bunge , Paul Hoyninengen-Huene identifies science with systematic knowledge, and proposes that systematicity can be used as a demarcation criterion.
However as shown by Naomi Oreskes, this is a problematic criterion, not least since some pseudosciences seem to satisfy it Oreskes A different approach, namely to base demarcation criteria on the value base of science, was proposed by sociologist Robert K. Merton [] The first of these, universalism , asserts that whatever their origins, truth claims should be subjected to preestablished, impersonal criteria.
This implies that the acceptance or rejection of claims should not depend on the personal or social qualities of their protagonists. The second imperative, communism , says that the substantive findings of science are the products of social collaboration and therefore belong to the community, rather than being owned by individuals or groups.
This is, as Merton pointed out, incompatible with patents that reserve exclusive rights of use to inventors and discoverers. His third imperative, disinterestedness , imposes a pattern of institutional control that is intended to curb the effects of personal or ideological motives that individual scientists may have.
The fourth imperative, organized scepticism , implies that science allows detached scrutiny of beliefs that are dearly held by other institutions. This is what sometimes brings science into conflicts with religions and ideologies. Merton described these criteria as belonging to the sociology of science, and thus as empirical statements about norms in actual science rather than normative statements about how science should be conducted Merton [] , His criteria have often been dismissed by sociologists as oversimplified, and they have only had limited influence in philosophical discussions on the demarcation issue Dolby ; Ruse Their potential in the latter context does not seem to have been sufficiently explored.
Most authors who have proposed demarcation criteria have instead put forward a list of such criteria. A large number of lists have been published that consist of usually 5—10 criteria that can be used in combination to identify a pseudoscience or pseudoscientific practice. This includes lists by Langmuir [] , Gruenberger , Dutch , Bunge , Radner and Radner , Kitcher , 30—54 , Grove , Thagard , — , Glymour and Stalker , Derksen , , Vollmer , Ruse , — and Mahner Many of the criteria that appear on such lists relate closely to criteria discussed above in Sections 4.
One such list reads as follows:. Some of the authors who have proposed multicriterial demarcations have defended this approach as being superior to any mono-criterial demarcation.
Hence, Bunge , asserted that many philosophers have failed to provide an adequate definition of science since they have presupposed that a single attribute will do; in his view the combination of several criteria is needed.
This would mean that there is a set of features that are characteristic of science, but although every part of science will have some of these features, we should not expect any part of science to have all of them.
Irzik and Nola proposed the use of this approach in science education. However, a multicriterial definition of science is not needed to justify a multicriterial account of how pseudoscience deviates from science. Even if science can be characterized by a single defining characteristic, different pseudoscientific practices may deviate from science in widely divergent ways. Some forms of pseudoscience have as their main objective the promotion of a particular theory of their own, whereas others are driven by a desire to fight down some scientific theory or branch of science.
The former type of pseudoscience has been called pseudo-theory promotion , and the latter science denial ism Hansson Pseudo-theory promotion is exemplified by homeopathy, astrology, and ancient astronaut theories.
Williams Other forms of science denial are relativity theory denial, tobacco disease denial, hiv denialism, and vaccination denialism. Many forms of pseudoscience combine pseudo-theory promotion with science denialism. However, as practiced today, creationism has a strong focus on the repudiation of evolution, and it is therefore predominantly a form of science denialism.
The most prominent difference between pseudo-theory promotion and science denial is their different attitudes to conflicts with established science. Science denialism usually proceeds by producing false controversies with legitimate science, i.
This is an old strategy, applied already in the s by relativity theory deniers Wazeck , — It has been much used by tobacco disease deniers sponsored by the tobacco industry Oreskes and Conway ; Dunlap and Jacques , and it is currently employed by climate science denialists Boykoff and Boykoff ; Boykoff However, whereas the fabrication of fake controversies is a standard tool in science denial, it is seldom if ever used in pseudo-theory promotion.
To the contrary, advocates of pseudosciences such as astrology and homeopathy tend to describe their theories as conformable to mainstream science. The term scepticism skepticism has at least three distinct usages that are relevant for the discussion on pseudoscience. First, scepticism is a philosophical method that proceeds by casting doubt on claims usually taken to be trivially true, such as the existence of the external world.
This has been, and still is, a highly useful method for investigating the justification of what we in practice consider to be certain beliefs.
Secondly, criticism of pseudoscience is often called scepticism. This is the term most commonly used by organisations devoted to the disclosure of pseudoscience. Thirdly, opposition to the scientific consensus in specific areas is sometimes called scepticism. Unwillingness to accept strongly supported factual statements is a traditional criterion of pseudoscience. See for instance item 5 on the list of seven criteria cited in Section 4. It is particularly useful in relation to fact-finding practices that are not parts of science.
Section 2. Generally speaking, conspiracy theories are theories according to which there exists some type of secret collusion for any type of purpose. In practice, the term mostly refers to implausible such theories, used to explain social facts that have other, considerably more plausible explanations.
Many pseudosciences are connected with conspiracy theories. For instance, one of the difficulties facing anti-vaccinationists is that they have to explain the overwhelming consensus among medical experts that vaccines are efficient. This is often done by claims of a conspiracy:. Conspiracy theories have peculiar epistemic characteristics that contribute to their pervasiveness. Keeley In particular, they are often associated with a type of circular reasoning that allows evidence against the conspiracy to be interpreted as evidence for it.
Frankfurt used the term to describe a type of falsehood that does not amount to lying. A person who lies deliberately chooses not to tell the truth, whereas a person who utters bullshit is not interested in whether what s he says is true or false, only in its suitability for his or her purpose.
Epistemic relativism is a term with many meanings; the meaning most relevant in discussions on pseudoscience is denial of the common assumption that there is intersubjective truth in scientific matters, which scientists can and should try to approach. The distinction between science and pseudoscience has no obvious role in epistemic relativism. Some academic epistemic relativists have actively contributed to the promotion of doctrines such as AIDS denial, vaccination denial, creationism, and climate science denial Hansson , Pennock However, the connection between epistemic relativism and pseudoscience is controversial.
Others have denied that epistemic relativism facilitates or encourages standpoints such as denial of anthropogenic climate change or other environmental problems Burningham and Cooper , This convergence of theoretically divergent demarcation criteria is a quite general phenomenon. Philosophers and other theoreticians of science differ widely in their views on what science is. Nevertheless, there is virtual unanimity in the community of knowledge disciplines on most particular issues of demarcation.
There is widespread agreement for instance that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology, ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change denialism are pseudosciences. There are a few points of controversy, for instance concerning the status of Freudian psychoanalysis, but the general picture is one of consensus rather than controversy in particular issues of demarcation.
It is in a sense paradoxical that so much agreement has been reached in particular issues in spite of almost complete disagreement on the general criteria that these judgments should presumably be based upon. This puzzle is a sure indication that there is still much important philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
Philosophical reflection on pseudoscience has brought forth other interesting problem areas in addition to the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Examples include related demarcations such as that between science and religion, the relationship between science and reliable non-scientific knowledge for instance everyday knowledge , the scope for justifiable simplifications in science education and popular science, the nature and justification of methodological naturalism in science Boudry et al , and the meaning or meaninglessness of the concept of a supernatural phenomenon.
Several of these problem areas have as yet not received much philosophical attention. The purpose of demarcations 2. Alternative demarcation criteria 4. Two forms of pseudo-science 6. Some related terms 6. The purpose of demarcations Demarcations of science from pseudoscience can be made for both theoretical and practical reasons Mahner , The demarcation issue is therefore important in practical applications such as the following: Climate policy : The scientific consensus on ongoing anthropogenic climate change leaves no room for reasonable doubt Cook et al.
Pennock Science education : The promoters of some pseudosciences notably creationism try to introduce their teachings in school curricula. Case 1 : A biochemist performs an experiment that she interprets as showing that a particular protein has an essential role in muscle contraction. There is a consensus among her colleagues that the result is a mere artefact, due to experimental error.
Case 2 : A biochemist goes on performing one sloppy experiment after the other. Sciences are testable, pseudo-sciences are not. So, Popper has this picture of the scientific attitude that involves taking risks: making bold claims, then gathering all the evidence you can think of that might knock them down.
If they stand up to your attempts to falsify them, the claims are still in play. But, you keep that hard-headed attitude and keep you eyes open for further evidence that could falsify the claims. If you decide not to watch for such evidence -- deciding, in effect, that because the claim hasn't been falsified in however many attempts you've made to falsify it, it must be true -- you've crossed the line to pseudo-science.
This sets up the central asymmetry in Popper's picture of what we can know. We can find evidence to establish with certainty that a claim is false. However, we can never owing to the problem of induction find evidence to establish with certainty that a claim is true. So the scientist realizes that her best hypotheses and theories are always tentative -- some piece of future evidence could conceivably show them false -- while the pseudo-scientist is sure as sure as can be that her theories have been proven true.
Of course, they haven't been -- problem of induction again. So, why does this difference between science and pseudo-science matter? As Popper notes, the difference is not a matter of scientific theories always being true and pseudo-scientific theories always being false. The important difference seems to be in which approach gives better logical justification for knowledge claims.
A pseudo-science may make you feel like you've got a good picture of how the world works, but you could well be wrong about it. If a scientific picture of the world is wrong, that hard-headed scientific attitude means the chances are good that we'll find out we're wrong -- one of those tests of our hypotheses will turn up the data that falsifies them -- and switch to a different picture. A few details are important to watch here. The first is the distinction between a claim that is falsifiable and a claim that has been falsified.
Popper says that scientific claims are falsifiable and pseudo-scientific claims are not. A claim that has been falsified demonstrated to be false is obviously a falsifiable claim because, by golly, it's been falsified. Once a claim has been falsified, Popper says the right thing to do is let it go and move on to a different falsifiable claim. However, it's not that the claim shouldn't have been a part of science in the first place.
So, the claim that the planets travel in circular orbits wasn't an inherently unscientific claim. Indeed, because it could be falsified by observations, it is just the kind of claim scientists should work with. Nothing conceivable is impossible. A science that doesn't appeal to my common sense can't be correct. True science should be understandable by anyone.
The first three of these attitudes have much in common with the Hermetic philosophy of the alchemists. They believed that if one was pure of spirit one might attain power over nature, a power equal to that of a god. The last two are a reaction against the complexity of science, which does indeed require a good grounding in mathematics to understand.
I devised a "joke" slogan to illustrate this: "If the gods had meant us to understand physics, they'd have made it simpler. Pseudoscientist's questioning of science is frequently motivated by some one thing the questioner doesn't like, or doesn't accept, or something that conflicts with a passionately held emotional conviction. They are usually totally unaware that "correcting" the thing they don't like in a way that suits them better has far broader implications.
For example, the perpetual motion inventor says, "I don't like Newton's third law, and I suspect that law isn't right. If it is wrong, I could make a reactionless engine and easily achieve perpetual motion. Such people just don't realize the vast interconnectedness of everything in science. Now we ask: "Is it reasonable to suppose that all of these are wrong?
I mean, seriously wrong? Are you saying that all the scientific experiments, precise measurements and applications of these scientific laws are wrong in ways no one had previously noticed? Are you prepared to rework physics from the ground up, trashing and replacing some 11 centuries of historical development?
What is to be gained by doing this? Now if the pseudoscientist could point to even one solid, repeatable, well tested experiment that conclusively demonstrates a flaw or exception to Newton's third law, that might be good reason for us to question the law, do more independent testing, and if the law is really found to be deficient, look for a way to modify the law to bring it into agreement with experiment.
But the pseudoscientist never can produce such evidence. He only "thinks" or "hopes" or has "intiution" or a "gut feeling" that science is wrong in a way that could allow him to achieve his cherished goal of perpetual motion. Then too, pseudoscientists almost always have deficient understanding of the science they despise or at least mistrust , which leads them to make errors of analysis or judgment that would embarrass a freshman physics major.
Another example is seen in those folks who wish to revive the classical theory of the ether. We ask them "Why? It's an emotional hang-up. I asked one perpetual motion believer why he thought perpetual motion could be possible. He candidly wrote to me: "I'm not sure why I am convinced it's possible, I guess it's just because I want it to be possible. The argument from incredulity.
I call this the "argument from incredulity". Here's another example: "I find it incomprehensible that bodies can exert forces on each other with nothing material in between, therefore there must be something in between. How is this different from the scientist who is so certain of conservation laws and the laws of thermodynamics, that these are never questioned? Even if some experimenter claims to have found a flaw in one of these laws, that person is dismissed as mistaken.
Suppose someone claims that he dropped a body from rest from a measured height, timed the fall, and found that the body accelerated at 2g , twice the "accepted" acceleration due to gravity. You need a brain to be conscious, but consciousness exists elsewhere. But TV studios generate and broadcast signals. Where, I inquired, is the consciousness equivalent to such production facilities? No answer. I understood none of what he was saying, but I am confident he's wrong by the fact that for a century thousands of physicists have challenged Einstein, and still he stands as Time 's Person of the Century.
It's not impossible that they are all wrong and that this part-time amateur scientist sleuth is right, but it is about as likely as the number of digits after the decimal place in Einstein's equations accurately describing the relativistic effects on those GPS satellite orbits. The EU folks I met were unfailingly polite, unquestionably smart and steadfastly unwavering in their belief that they have made one of the most important discoveries in the history of science.
Have they? Probably not. Michael Shermer is publisher of Skeptic magazine www. Already a subscriber?
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